42 U.S.C. § 1983 |
1. An action under the color of law
2. A deprivation of a constitutional right as a consequence of that action
-- A deprivation of a federally-protected right
-- Acts under color of state law
when engaged in a conspiricy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights
The initiation of a criminal prosecution... produces "a wrenching distrution of everyday life."Every prosecution, like every arrest "is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, weather he is free on bail or not, and may distrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloque, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends."
An official accusation of a serious crime has a direct impact on a range of identified liberty interests. That impact moreover, is of sufficient magnitude to qualify as a deprivation of liberty meriting constitutional protection.
Albright v. Oliver (92-833), 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
In framing his claim of infringement of a liberty interest in freedom from the initiation of
a baseless prosecution,
petitioner has chosen to disclaim any reliance on the Fourth Amendment seizure that followed when he surrendered himself into police custody. Petitioner has failed, however, to allege any substantial injury that is attributable to the former even (seizure), but not the latter (police custody).His complaint presents an extensive list of damages: limitations on his liberty, freedom of association, and freedom of movement by virtue of the terms of his bond; financial expense of his legal defense; reputational harm among members of the community; inability to transact business or obtain employment in his local area, necessitating relocation to St. Louis; inability to secure credit; and personal pain and suffering.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a-50a.None of these injuries, however, is alleged to have followed from the issuance of the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from the ensuing assertion of custody.
Thus, petitioner has not shown a substantial deprivation of liberty from the mere initiation of prosecution.
This conclusion should end our inquiry. Whether the Due Process Clause in any given case may provide a "duplication of protections," ante, at 2 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) is irrelevant to whether a liberty interest is at stake. [n.29] Even assuming the dubious proposition that, in this case, due process protection against
a baseless prosecution
may not provide "a substantial increment to protection otherwise available," ibid., [n.30] that is a consideration relevant only to damages, not to the existence of constitutional protection. Furthermore, that few of petitioner's injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does not make those injuries insubstantial.To the contrary, I can think of few powers that the State possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, can harm liberty as substantially as the filing of criminal charges.It seems to me quite wrong to attribute to a subsequent arrest
the reputational and other harms caused by
an unjustified accusation.In addition, although Justice Ginsburg is prepared to hold
that a Fourth Amendment claim does not accrue untilthe baseless charges
are dismissed, at least some of the Courts of Appeals have held
that the arrest triggers the running of the statute of limitations.See, e. g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 331, 351 (CA3 1989);
McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F. 2d 903, 906 (CA6 1988);
Mack v. Varelas, 835 F. 2d 995, 1000 (CA2 1987);
Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F. 2d 1144, 1146 (CA9 1983).And, given the disposition of this case, a majority of this Court might agree.
In any event, uncertainties about such matters counsel against constitutional adjudication
based upon "pragmatic concerns."Albright v. Oliver (92-833), 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
-- http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-833.ZC3.html |
"The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty." Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 (1857).
Albright v. Oliver (92-833), 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
The question on which we granted certiorari is whether the initiation of criminal charges absent probable cause is a deprivation of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Neither the fact that the seizure caused by petitioner's arrest also deprived him of liberty, nor the possible availability of an affirmative defense, is a sufficient reason for failing to discuss or decide this question. The question whether one is protected by the Due Process Clause from unfounded prosecutions has implications beyond whether damages are ultimately obtainable. Indeed, in this very case petitioner's complaint sought injunctive relief in addition to damages.
Albright v. Oliver (92-833), 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
DUKE CASE
Someone needed to lead the way against a prosecutor who was malicious, not mistaken.
-- http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/gaynor/070325 |
DUKE CASE
For many observers, the main lesson learned from this case was that if you're the scion of a rich white family that can afford excellent counsel, then you will achieve justice. As the previous poster noted, that is not often the case.
Where is the outrage for all the other victims of baseless prosecution?
-- http://volokh.com/posts/1170135133.shtml |
HONOLULU POLICE
The resolution of this case sends a clear message to Honolulu police and prosecutors "that our society and justice system will not stand for
baseless prosecution
that is vindictive and retaliatory in nature," Otake said.
-- http://starbulletin.com/2007/03/20/news/story03.html |
